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ABSTRACT
Prior literature points to the importance of party power and ideology for
interest group-party contacts in the legislative arena. But interest groups do
not often have ideologies – they are typically active in a small number of
policy domains and there may be different parties that share more similar
preferences across different policy areas. Therefore, we examine whether and
how party power and proximity in policy preferences predict the existence of
party-interest group ‘lobby routines’ in specific policy domains, using a novel
survey of representative samples of interest groups in seven long-established
democracies. We find that groups often form routines with different parties
in different policy areas and that preference proximity on relevant policy
dimensions is positively associated with having such area-specific lobby
routines. However, the results also suggest that powerful parties are more
likely allies and that the effect of policy proximity on routines is positively
conditioned by power.
KEYWORDS Interest groups; political parties; interaction; lobbying; policy dimensions
Introduction
Every day interest groups try to influence public decision-making in democ-
racies all over the world. One way they may succeed, is by structured inter-
action with political parties, because parties directly make policy and have
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a high capacity to influence the behaviour of elected officials (Klüver, 2020).
But even if scholars have long recognised the importance of interaction
between parties and organised interests (Key, 1964; Schattschneider, 1948),
we know relatively little about these topics (Allern, Hansen, Marshall, et al.,
2020; Hojnacki et al., 2012).
Much of the lobbying literature has focused on why groups choose to inter-
act with individual decision-makers (Austen-Smith & Wright, 1994; Baumgart-
ner & Leech, 1996; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998), while the literature on party-
interest group relationships has concentrated on examining general organis-
ational ties (Allern & Bale, 2017). It is only recently that scholars have begun
to systematically theorise about and analyse less formal but still structured
party-interest group interactions, across issues and institutions (e.g., Berkhout
et al., 2019; Eichenberger & Mach, 2017; Koger et al., 2009; Marshall, 2015;
Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017; Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013; Witko, 2009).
Our contribution is to examine what we call interest groups’ ‘lobby routines’
vis-à-vis political parties in different policy domains. Rather than trying to target
individual legislators regardless of party, some groups seek to regularly talk to a
particular party or parties, in a particular policy area, over time. They may
regard particular parties as more valuable in helping them solve specific
policy problems or simply aim at reducing transaction costs (Klüver, 2020).
These domain-specific interactions are important to understand because
policy subsystems are essential for policymaking (Gronow et al., 2019; Sabatier,
1998). While groups may avoid such routines due to uncertainty regarding
benefits, or limited organisational capacity, we ask: how do interest groups pur-
suing a lobby routine strategy choose their party targets?
Resource exchange theory would suggest that powerful parties are attrac-
tive partners for interest groups because they have a greater ability to shape
policy (Fouirnaies & Hall, 2014; McLean, 1987). However, studies have also
shown that interest groups lobby legislators who are their presumed allies
rather than likely opponents (Baumgartner & Leech, 1996; Hojnacki &
Kimball, 1998) and rather than attempt to change minds provide subsidies
to allies to help achieve mutually preferred policy outcomes (Hall &
Deardorff, 2006). These types of findings have led Berkhout et al. (2019,
p. 1) to define the ‘standard model’ of interaction between parties and inter-
est group as resting on ‘power and ideological proximity as two main expla-
natory factors’ (see also Brunell, 2005; De Bruycker, 2016; Fraussen & Halpin,
2018; Heaney, 2010; Klüver, 2020; Marshall, 2015; Otjes & Rasmussen, 2017).
We think that power is a critical factor shaping lobby routines but are less
certain about the utility of ideological proximity in explaining lobby routines
in specific policy domains. Though the literature on organisational party ties
also suggests ideological kinship is important (e.g., Allern & Bale, 2017), in con-
temporary politics most interest groups are intense policy demanders on one
or a small number of issues and do not clearly have an ideology per se. Instead,
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they have policy preferences on specific issues and in particular policy domains
and may have preferences closer to different parties in different domains.
Therefore, we consider policy position proximity in different policy areas and
examine how this, along with power considerations, shapes lobby routines.
We argue that policy position proximity makes lobby routines with particular
parties more likely, but also that it still matters how powerful specific parties
are and that the importance of policy proximity for lobby routines should
matter more if parties are powerful.
To test our arguments, we use data from a novel survey of representative
samples of interest groups in seven Western democracies. We develop a new
measure of the domain-specific proximity of party-interest group policy pre-
ferences by calculating the distance between the Chapel Hill expert estimate
of a party’s position on the most relevant policy dimension and the interest
group’s self-placement on the same policy dimension. The findings provide
support for our predictions and have important implications for the study
of representation and public policy outcomes.
Theorising interest group and party lobby routines
Parties and interest groups are mutually dependent on each other to reach
their goals (Witko, 2009). Parties’ office- and policy-seeking rely on interest
groups to mobilise financing, volunteers and voters (Allern & Bale, 2017).
Moreover, interest groups are one of several important sources of expert
information that help parties’ craft policy (Ainsworth & Sened, 1993;
Austen-Smith, 1993; Bouwen, 2004; Chalmers, 2013; Dür et al., 2019). As
groups transmit political input and support from civil society, they may
also boost the legitimacy of party decision-making. Interest groups, for
their part, are dependent on parties to advance their policy goals because
in many countries parties exercise considerable control over the legislative
agenda and voting in parliament (Quinn, 2002; Warner, 2000). While inter-
actions between parties and groups in the policy process can result from
general organisational ties (Allern, Otjes, Poguntke, et al., 2020), probably
more common are interest group ‘lobby routines’ of the type we examine
here: situations where a group usually talks to a specific party across issues
in a given policy domain. Working with the same party repeatedly reduces
transaction costs, increasing efficiency in pursuit of policy goals.
That said, interest groups do not have to establish routines with parties in
legislatures to shape policy. They can instead target executive branch
officials, civil servants or the courts, for example. Within legislatures, interest
groups might work with individual legislators regardless of party. Of course,
these activities require resources, so groups with limited capacity will have
less opportunity to pursue any one of them. Even for groups with abundant
resources, however, some may prefer to avoid lobby routines with parties
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 3
because they involve costs, tradeoffs and uncertainty. For instance, establish-
ing routines with one or a few parties can mean forgoing access to multiple
parties. Additionally, parties arguably have the upper hand in such inter-
actions because there are many potential groups that can provide parties
information through interaction but relatively few party partners for interest
groups (Witko, 2009). Thus, interest groups need parties more than parties
need groups, and groups risk investing time in routines and getting little in
return. Given these downsides and other possible means of shaping policy
why do groups choose lobby routines with particular parties?
As noted above, we agree that both power and proximity in policy goals
are likely to stimulate groups to interact with parties in line with the ‘standard
model’. However, we think that policy proximity is more useful to explain
lobby routines than general ideological kinship because modern interest
groups are distinctive for not having wholesale ideological profiles in the par-
tisan sense. More typically, they have issue preferences in a small number of
domains in which they focus limited resources to be effective (Bernhagen
et al., 2015). Yet, there might be connections between issue positions
enabling groups to place themselves in a partisan policy space defined by
separate dimensions (Beyers et al., 2015). It is exactly this type of positioning
we think is of relevance for groups’ choice of establishing lobby routines,
which is a meso-level concept that does not take place in highly centralised
interactions between party and interest group leaders, nor at the micro-level
of the legislator. Groups may prefer different parties in different policy areas.
In sum, this suggests that we should think in terms of key conflicts and agree-
ments in different policy areas rather than think about general ideological
profiles.
If the general policy goals of parties and interest groups in a particular
domain are shared, there is a good chance that the party will consistently
pursue the interests of the group (Connelly et al., 2011; Veit & Scholz,
2016). If this policy agreement exists, lobby routines can help both parties
and groups achieve their specific goals by subsidising party efforts in particu-
lar policy areas with the systematic provision of information through regular-
ised contact (Hall & Deardorff, 2006). Thus, we expect that:
The Policy Distance Hypothesis (H1): the smaller the policy position distance
between an interest group and a political party’s position in a given policy
area, the higher the probability of a lobby routine with that party.
It is also clear that powerful parties are an attractive partner for interest
groups attempting to influence policy on specific issues (Berkhout et al.,
2019; Fouirnaies & Hall, 2014; Marshall, 2015; Quinn, 2002; Warner, 2000).
Even if the party is distant in terms of policy preferences, it might be
willing to give policy concessions and since it is powerful, these are likely
to materialise as public policy. Moreover, as Berkhout et al. (2019) note,
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‘relatively powerful parties are also more likely to need particular types of
policy-related information offered by interest groups’ (p. 2). Studies confirm
that organised interests do seek to interact with powerful parties in many
different legislatures (Brunell, 2005; De Bruycker, 2016; Marshall, 2015; Otjes
& Rasmussen, 2017). Since lobby routines can be established with more
than one party, it is possible for organisations to address the most proximate
party and the most powerful party if this is not the same, especially in multi-
party systems. Thus, all other things being equal, we expect that:
The Party Power Hypothesis (H2): the more powerful a party is, the higher the
probability of a group establishing a lobby routine with that party in a given
policy area.
That said, groups that, due to capacity constraints, will have to prioritise
one strategy, when party qualities do not overlap, will probably emphasise
policy proximity. First, because powerful parties have more leverage to
extract resources without providing much in return, enduring lobby routines
may be difficult to maintain (cf. Lowery et al., 2005). Second, the long-term
horizon of routines allows groups to also take into account whether proxi-
mate opposition parties are likely to end up in power next time. Thus, we
expect policy proximity to be a more important factor than party power.
Finally, we argue that the effect of policy proximity differs depending on
the level of party power. Both factors are relevant for the same group incen-
tive: prospects of influencing public policy. First, power is likely to strengthen
the effect of policy proximity because powerful parties are better able to
affect public policy and thus pursue group interests more efficiently. When
parties are powerful, the value of shared interests increases. Second, prefer-
ence proximity will probably matter less for establishment of lobby routines
if the party is less powerful since such a party is less likely to influence public
decision-making anyway. The value of pursuing shared interests is reduced
when parties are weak. Hence, we suggest that the effect of policy proximity
is positively conditioned by party power:
The Reinforcing Hypothesis (H3): the relationship between policy proximity
and the probability of the group establishing a lobby routine with that party
is stronger when the party is more powerful.
Parties that are both powerful and proximate on a relevant dimension, in a
given policy area, are more attractive than one would expect merely on
the basis of their power and proximity.
Research design
To test our expectations, we primarily use a novel survey data set on interest
groups in seven long-established democracies: Denmark, France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the United States.1
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 5
While this number of countries is too small to systematically examine
country-level variation, we aim to cover interest groups operating in
systems with relatively similar historical and economic preconditions but
that vary in their institutional settings to produce more generalisable
findings. The seven countries differ in terms of party finance regimes, corpor-
atism vs. pluralism and separation of powers. These are all aspects that might
stimulate or dampen groups’ incentives to establish routines.
An interest group was defined as any non-party and non-governmental
formal association of individuals or organisations that, based on one or
more shared concerns, advocates a particular interest/cause in public and
usually attempts to influence public policy in its favour in one way or
another. The surveys conducted in 2017–2018 combined two different
sampling strategies. First, a random sample of interest groups was drawn
in each country from sampling frames based on available sources of national
interest group populations. Second, we supplemented this with a small, pur-
posive sample of the ‘most important interest groups’ within eight different
categories, active in different policy areas, to make sure that a significant
number of key groups were covered. Thus, the total sample mirrors the
general group population, but with a certain ‘over-sampling’ of major
actors (see Allern, Hansen, Røed, et al., 2020 for details on sampling strategy).
857 out of 2944 interest groups responded across countries (29 percent).
In line with recent cross-national interest group surveys the response rates
across countries vary (e.g., Dür & Matteo, 2013; Marchetti, 2015; Rasmussen
& Lindeboom, 2013), ranging from nearly 60 percent in Norway to just
below 10 percent in the United States. Response rates do not differ
significantly in terms of group types (see for Allern, Hansen, Røed, et al.,
2020 for details on response rates). Due to the low US response rate we
also estimated models without it (see Online Appendix Table A2.7), and we
control for heterogeneity between the countries by including country
fixed-effects in the models.
Dependent variable
The survey asked groups a series of questions about connections with indi-
vidual parties represented in their national legislatures, ranging from only
two in the United States to ten in the Netherlands. Our dependent variable
indicates whether an interest group has what we refer to as a ‘lobby
routine’with the party in question in a specific policy area. First, we presented
groups with a list of 24 policy areas (listed in Table A.1.1) and asked them to
mention up to three of them in which they had been most active during the
last two years. 11 percent of groups indicated that they were not active in any
of the policy areas included in the survey,2 22 percent were active in one area,
19 percent two and, 48 percent three. Then for each active area we asked,
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When trying to give input to a public decision-making process on a major policy
issue, an organization might as a ‘standard procedure’ talk to a particular party/
parties and/or their representatives first, independent of whether they are in
government or not. Does your organization usually talk to any of the following
parties in particular when trying to give input into the decision-making process
on a major issue within the policy areas you are most active?
Thus, the question refers to both the party as a collective unit and individ-
uals acting on behalf of the party in the legislature. In this way, we capture the
party both at the individual and organisational level and exclude contact with
politicians acting without ‘the party hat’ on. The measure is not context-sen-
sitive and should thus work well across the political systems we are studying.3
For every area a group is active within, we can thus see whether they rou-
tinely lobby particular parties or not. After transforming the data structure,
our observation is no longer of individual interest groups, but the triad of
group-party-policy area. Lobby routines are reported in about a quarter of
these party-group-policy area triads, and approximately half of the interest
groups report having a lobby routine in at least one policy area. This
means that triads involving those reporting to have no such routines at all
(in any of the three policy areas), are included in the analysis. By including
these cases, we have a more conservative test: if we include groups that
have zeros on the dependent variable for all parties irrespective of their
power or policy proximity, the associations with these factors should be
lower than if they were excluded. Moreover, as will become clear below,
we account for factors that are associated with not having lobby routines:
we exclude groups with no issue positions from the analysis and control
for the groups’ capacity to lobby in general. In the Online Appendix (Table
A2.1) we show that these factors are strongly associated with not having a
lobby routine at all.
Independent variables
To test The Policy Distance Hypothesis (H1), we developed a novel measure
based on our survey and party policy position placement from an expert
survey. The construction of this variable is slightly complicated since we
have various policy areas, but conceptually it is straightforward. We calcu-
lated the distance between the expert estimate of a party’s position on rel-
evant policy dimensions and the interest group’s self-placement on the
same policy dimensions.
First, we asked groups to position themselves on six eleven-point scales
concerning the environment, immigration, social lifestyle, government inter-
vention in the economy, redistribution and the choice between lower taxa-
tion and better public services. These eleven-point scales come from the
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2017). We also
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provided our key informants with the party positions from the latest round of
the CHES so that they had a common baseline and could position their group
relative to the parties (see Online Appendix, Section 1) for an illustration). For
each interest group that took a position on a given policy dimension, we cal-
culate the absolute distance between the CHES positioning of the party and
the interest groups’ self-positioning. An interest group was removed from the
analysis if it did not have a position on any of the six dimensions in question.
Second, in order to measure policy distance in a given policy area where
groups could indicate they had a lobbying routine, we deductively
matched each of our policy areas to one of the CHES dimensions included
in the survey (see Table A1.1). This was done by assigning a policy area to
the CHES scale expected to be the closest fit for measuring attitudes
towards the policy area in question. For example, we matched healthcare
and social affairs policy to the redistribution CHES dimension. Note that the
same CHES policy dimension might be relevant for more than one of our
policy areas in which groups could have lobbying routines. Moreover, for
five policy areas in the international sphere no comparable dimension was
available. In Online Appendix (Table A2.6) we show that our analysis is
robust to switching each match to the second-best alternative. Hence, our
policy distance measure reflects the proximity in policy preferences of
groups and parties and the distance can differ between specific policy
dimensions.
The Party Power Hypothesis (H2) states that interest groups are more
likely to establish a routine with powerful parties. To measure party power,
we collected data on seat shares and government participation at the time
of survey launch (Armingeon et al., 2018; Döring & Manow, 2018). We con-
structed an additive scale that combines the share of seats parties have in
the present term and whether they are in government. The benefit of
doing so is that we can include both measures in the same model even
though they are highly correlated. This measure matches the enduring
nature of routines: it captures who is in government now and who has a
reasonable probability of being in government tomorrow because of their
large current seat share, even if they are not currently in power (either as
majority party or coalition partner). That said, a party not in government
always scores at the lower half of the scale.
Finally, we included the interaction between distance and power to test
The Reinforcing Hypothesis (H3).
Controls
We control for several factors. Groups with more resources will have a greater
ability to form relationships in the first place because resources make interest
groups more attractive partners for parties.
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First, money can help groups establish a lobby routine because for parties
it is essential to organisational survival (e.g., paying for staff and facilities) and
other party goals (Allern & Bale, 2017). However, other forms of support from
groups are also important (Klüver, 2020). Therefore, we use a five-item scale –
group donations – constructed from items in the interest group survey where
we asked groups whether they provided a direct financial contribution, an
indirect financial contribution, whether they contributed labour, material
resources or their organisation’s premises during election campaigns to par-
ticular parties.4 To test validity of this item we compared the survey responses
on direct financial contributions with publicly available information. There
were only a few mismatches and these could be explained by ambiguity of
reporting rules.
We also include a dummy variable for whether the group has members.
Our expectation is that organisations without members (for instance, organ-
isations representing governments) are less likely to have lobby routines with
parties because they cannot provide votes. For parties, groups that can
provide high-quality information and expertise will also be more attractive
partners (Ainsworth & Sened, 1993). Therefore, we use a dummy variable to
control for whether groups have regular employees monitoring and com-
menting on public affairs (policy staff). Fourth, we control for group origin
by including a dummy variable that differentiates between interest groups
representing specialist economic interests (e.g., trade unions, business) and
others. Such groups have been prominent players in some of the classic
examples of interest group-party collaboration (e.g., between unions and
labour parties) and it is possible that historical legacies have a positive
impact on the likelihood of establishing current lobby routines. This variable
can also be argued to capture the possible effect of actually having a broad
ideological (left-right) profile. To ensure that the associations with the
different independent variables are easily comparable they are all recalcu-
lated, so their minimum is zero and their maximum is one.5
Method of data analysis
First, we simply examine descriptive statistics to understand how common it
is to have a lobby routine with a party, and whether this is typically with a
party that is policy proximate or powerful. Next, we estimate cross-classified
mixed logistic regressions accounting for the fact that our dependent vari-
able is dichotomous, and our data has a multi-level structure with possible
dependencies between the cases within groups, political parties, policy
areas and countries. In order to determine which multilevel structure is
necessary, we ran a number of empty models (in Table A2.2 in the Online
Appendix). These showed that most variance is at the party and the group
level, leading us to ultimately use a cross-classified model with party and
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group random effects. We use country dummies to control for unobserved
heterogeneity between the political systems.
Descriptive results
We begin with some descriptive results (Tables 1 and 2). First, the extent to
which groups are active in policy areas varies. One in ten groups are not
active in any areas and one of five is active on only one. About the same
share of groups is active in two areas and half of groups are active in the
maximum number of policy areas they could indicate (three).
The extent to which these groups have a lobby routine with parties also
differs. About half of the groups indicate that they have no lobby routine
with specific parties at all. Table 1 shows that the more policy areas a
group is active in, the more likely it is they have lobby routines involving
parties: out of the groups that are active in a single area, 28 percent have a
lobby routine. Out of the groups that are active on three areas, 62 percent
have a lobby routine. On average 59 percent of groups that have a lobby
routine in more than one area, focus on different parties in those areas.
Overall, there is considerable diversity within the groups that we are examin-
ing in the number of policy fields in which they are active, in whether they
have a lobby routine and in whether they have the same routine partner in
different areas.
As can be seen in Table 2, on average, a group reports having a lobby
routine with approximately one in four parties per policy area. If we disregard
the groups that have no routine, groups report having a routine with about
half of the parties in a country or two parties per policy area on average. This
means that groups with a routine tend to report contacts with on average
four parties. Most groups are not focused on a single party, which again
suggests the utility of examining interactions by policy domain and that
some might follow a ‘dual strategy’ of pursuing proximity and power.
Before we turn to the direct effect of policy distance, we have to mention
that the extent to which groups were able to identify their own position on
the policy scales differs: 34 percent of the groups cannot position themselves
on any dimension, 22 percent of groups position themselves on each of the
six dimensions. Between those two extremes, the remaining 50 percent of
Table 1. Group activity by number of areas groups are active on.
Areas









One 22% 72% 28%
Two 19% 48% 22% 29%
Three 48% 38% 23% 38%
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groups are evenly divided. All in all, though, most groups are not active in
many policy domains but are able to place themselves on at least one
policy dimension.6
Multivariate results
To evaluate the importance of policy distance compared to power and con-
trolling for a number of other relevant factors we look at five multivariate
models (see Table 3). We first present a model with only policy distance
(Model 1), a model with power (Model 2), and one including both variables
(Model 3). Model 4 combines the two variables with a number of controls.
Model 5 adds the interaction, which allows us to test the third hypothesis.
The models show very consistent results for policy distance and party
power and there are only minor differences for our control variables. The
number of cases is fixed in the different models in order to make sure
that we can compare the coefficients and AIC statistics between models,
since the AIC is dependent on sample size (Burnham & Anderson, 2004,
p. 271).
First, we find strong evidence that the policy distance between parties and
groups decreases the likelihood of a routine lobby connection (The Policy
Distance Hypothesis, H1). There is a strong and significant relationship in
the expected direction in each of the models in Table 3. In each of these,
the effect is similar in strength, direction and level of significance. In
Model 4 in Table 3, which includes party power and all control variables,
the likelihood of lobbying ties decreases from 41 percent to 21 percent
when moving from the party-organisation dyads that are closest to each
other in a policy area to those that are furthest from each other the. It is
thus clear that policy proximity plays a role in the development of lobby
routines.
We also see that The Party Power Hypothesis (H2) is supported: 53
percent of the most powerful parties (parties that have more than fifty
percent of the seats and are in government) are predicted to be part of an
interest group’s lobby routine, compared to 28 percent for the least powerful.
Table 2. Descriptives.
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. N High
Lobby routine 0.26 - - 0 1 14209 Routine present
Policy distance 0.30 0.27 0.21 0 1 6910 Most distant
Party power 0.24 0.07 0.29 0 1 13973 Most powerful
Group donations 0.01 0.00 0.06 0 1 9652 Every kind of
donation
Non-membership group 0.13 - - 0 1 14209 No membership
Policy Staff (>5) 0.19 - - 0 1 14209 Any Policy Staff
Specialist economic interest
group
0.51 - - 0 1 14209 Special group
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We furthermore expected that power and policy distance have a multipli-
cative effect beyond these simple additive effects (The Reinforcing Hypoth-
esis, H3). The results are shown in Model 5 and displayed graphically in Figure
1. These show a significant interaction effect between policy distance and
power. When a party is powerful, the effect of policy distance is strong
while the effect of policy distance is weaker for parties with little power. Rou-
tines are most likely to occur when policy distance is small, and power is high.
The likelihood of having a lobby routine in that case is about three in four for
the powerful parties and only three in ten for the least powerful parties. As
distance increases the likelihood of having a routine decreases; but for the
least powerful parties it decreases by 36 percent, while for the most powerful
parties, this likelihood decreases by 65 percent. The decrease is smaller for the
least powerful parties (from three in ten to three in twenty). While the
difference in having a routine between powerful and non-powerful parties
is significant when they are close, the difference is no longer significant
beyond a distance of 0.8.
While policy distance also affects the likelihood of having a lobby routine
for powerless parties according to Model 5, its effect is much smaller for such
parties. This is consistent with the Reinforcing Hypothesis (H3): the more
powerful a party is, the stronger the effect of policy distance on the prob-
ability of the group establishing a lobby routine with that party. Likewise,
the value of policy proximity is clearly reduced for less powerful parties.
The effect of the control variables are generally as expected. 96 percent of the
triads where groups actively donated all the different resources to a party have a
lobby routine. But these are only exceptional cases (1 percent of the cases). In the
cases without any donations the likelihood of lobby routines is low (33 percent).
We also find a strong positive effect of staff resources. 44 percent of the groups
that have any policy workers are predicted to have a lobby routine involving par-
ticular parties compared to 31 percent for the groups that have no policy
workers. Whether a group has members is also associated with whether they
include a party in their lobby routine, albeit not in the expected direction: 32
percent with members and 40 percent without. Groups representing economic
interests are not significantly more likely to have a lobby routine than the
remaining groups. Overall, the controls suggest that abundant resources
enhance the ability to form lobby routines. All these results are visualised in
Online Appendix (Figure A2.3 to A2.6). Finally, we see that all countries tend
to score higher than France, especially groups in Denmark and the Netherlands,
which might suggest that institutional differences like the degree of corporatism
play a part, although further study is needed to disentangle this.
How should we evaluate the relative importance of policy distance versus
power? Moreover, do the two theoretical models reinforce each other? In
order to answer these questions, we compare the AIC scores, which is a rela-
tive measure of model fit with lower scores indicating a better fit. Any model
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with an AIC 10 points higher than the AIC of another model, has ‘essentially
no support’ to be a better model than the other (Burnham & Anderson, 2004,
p. 271). Comparing Model 1 to Model 2, we observe that the AIC is more than
10 points lower in Model 1: this means that when considered alone policy dis-
tance has, as assumed, more explanatory power than political power. We
further observe that AIC values drop by more than 10 points when we add
both policy distance and power; when we add the control variables the fits
improve by another ten points. The interaction provides the best fit of the
models in Table 3, but in terms of strength it is comparable to the model
without the interaction. Finally, extensive robustness tests are included in
Online Appendix (Section 2), and the results generally hold.
Table 3. Logistic regression models.
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Policy distance −1.17*** −1.19*** −1.11*** −0.63**
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.23)
Party power 1.48*** 1.56*** 1.54*** 2.06***
(0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.40)
Group donations 4.25*** 4.21***
(0.81) (0.81)
Non-membership group 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.09) (0.09)
Policy workers (>5) 0.58*** 0.58***
(0.08) (0.08)
Specialist economic interest group 0.03 0.02
(0.07) (0.07)
Policy distance * Party power −1.61**
(0.53)
Country (baseline: France)
Denmark 1.24** 1.16** 1.21** 1.17** 1.19**
(0.45) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
Germany 0.92+ 0.89* 0.93* 0.98* 0.98*
(0.48) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
Netherlands 1.15** 1.28*** 1.32*** 1.21** 1.23***
(0.43) (0.36) (0.36) (0.37) (0.37)
Norway 0.83+ 0.91* 0.89* 0.96* 0.99*
(0.45) (0.38) (0.38) (0.39) (0.39)
UK 0.56 0.68+ 0.70+ 0.67 0.72+
(0.48) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41) (0.41)
US 1.94** 1.26+ 1.30* 0.83 0.84
(0.75) (0.66) (0.66) (0.69) (0.69)
Constant −1.22*** −1.96*** −1.64*** −1.91*** −2.06***
(0.34) (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32)










Residual Standard Deviation Constant 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Party-level Random Effects 0.85 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.71
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Number of Cases 4914 4914 4914 4914 4914
AIC 5709 5749 5695 5562 5555
BIC 5780 5820 5773 5666 5665
Cross-Classified Multilevel logistic regression coefficients with standard errors.
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
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Conclusion
This article adds to the literature on the interactions between parties and
interest groups. While previous studies have often focused on either issue-
oriented lobbying of individual politicians or general organisational party-
group ties, we address interest group-party lobby routines in different policy
domains. These are important because in increasingly pluralistic politics
this is where much influence takes place. Moreover, while those studies of
party-group contacts that actually exist posit that power and ideology best
predict these interactions, we argue that most groups do not have an ideol-
ogy, and that it is more useful to think in terms of policy proximity and dis-
tance along specific policy dimensions. Our descriptive statistics showing
that many groups do not position themselves on more than one or two
policy dimensions bore this out. In this way, we are able to account for
cross-area party variation in the groups’ lobby routines. Empirically, we
Figure 1. Predicted proportion having a routine as function of policy distance. Grey
lines: high power (power = 1); black lines: low power (power = 0). Predicted proportion
with 90 percent confidence intervals. Based on Model 5.
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contribute by analysing data from a novel survey of representative samples of
interest groups across seven established democracies.
Generally, we find support for our predictions. Interest groups select
parties with proximate general policy positions to work with in the policy
areas that they care most about. The results could similarly indicate that
parties are more willing to regularly talk to groups who share their policy
orientation in a given area. Thus, even if shorter-term power considerations
play a part, it seems as if groups apply at least a medium-term perspective
when trying to establish a lobby routine. We also saw that policy distance
has more explanatory power alone than party power. At the same time,
the results suggest that power and policy distance are not necessarily com-
peting explanations: they explain more together than they do apart. In
addition, there is an interaction effect between the two, where the effect
of policy proximity is particularly strong for the most powerful parties.
Parties that are both powerful and proximate on a relevant dimension, in a
given policy area, are more attractive than one would expect merely on
the basis of their power and proximity. The two factors reinforce each
other making this combination particularly attractive.
A question for future research is why certain groups do not form lobby
routines with political parties at all. Future research should also consider
the implications of the lack of lobby routines for policy influence. It seems
clear that group resources help in the establishment of lobby routine,
which explains some of the absence of routines. Another possible expla-
nation for the absence of lobby routines is that some groups may not be
able to position themselves, or relate to, the predominant dimensions in par-
ticular policy areas either because they pursue interests of limited party-pol-
itical relevance/controversy or they may have fundamentally different policy
preferences than any existing parties. How such differences affect patterns of
political influence, are possible avenues for future studies.
A key goal for future research is also to improve the analysis of causality.
We have identified correlations in line with expectations, but it is indeed
possible that the relationship between lobby routines and issue positions
goes both ways: that establishment of a lobby routine will, in turn make it
more likely that parties and groups are issue proximate in the future due
to contact and (mutual) influence. Our study does not delve into these par-
ticular causal questions, but if data on interest group behaviour over time
becomes available, it will become possible to examine these dynamics in
more detail.
Clearly, interest group influence attempts go beyond single issues and the
short-term perspective of who is currently in power. Our findings suggest that
policy-based group-party structures, and perhaps even alliances, exist in
different fields. The revealed group-party routines might constrain party
decision-makers but also group leaders. How this affects parties, and
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groups, as vehicles of representation is a key issue for future research. Taking
into account the possible existence of lobby routines and thus relations when
trying to explain both policy inputs and outcomes in legislative politics can
advance our understanding of how representative democracy and the
policy process work.
Notes
1. ‘Party-Interest Group Relationships in Contemporary Democracies’ (PAIRDEM),
see https://pairdem.org/pairdem/
2. These were not included in the analysis.
3. Importantly, we refrain from asking interest groups to indicate the ‘intensity of
their interaction’ given that talking to a party as a ‘standard procedure’ already
refers to regularised interaction of a high intensity.
4. These items scale very well according a Mokken scaling analysis (Loevinger’s
H=0.60).
5. The strongest bivariate relationship between the independent variables in our
analysis belongs to the robustness tests (see Online Appendix): a correlation
between ‘party challenger status’ and ‘the year a party obtained parliamentary
representation’ of 0.36. All other bivariate correlations are well below that level.
We do not include these two variables in the same analysis.
6. Interestingly, the extent to which groups have lobby routines involving parties at
all closely follows this: out of thosewho cannot place themselves on any dimension
36% report having a lobby routine, this increases over to 74% for the groups that
can place themselves on each dimension. One of the explanations of why groups
do not have lobby routines may reflect whether they have positions along the
same policy dimensions as parties, or seek other types of policy goals. In the
Online Appendix (Table A2.1), we study this issue in greater detail by also including
the units without any positions on the six policy dimensions.
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